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Abstract. In this paper, I will examine the representative halfer and thirder solutions to
the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Two solutions give different answers for the probability of
today being Monday that the sleeping beauty should rationally assign. Then by examining
the definition of events, it is concluded that the representative thirder solution is wrong
and the halfers are right, but that the representative halfer solution also contains wrong
logical arguments.
1. Introduction: Sleeping Beauty Problem
The description of Sleeping Beauty Problem appears in Elga (2000), and is
given the following:
“Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that
your sleep will last (Monday, Tuesday), they will briefly wake you up either
once (only on Monday) or twice (both Monday and Tuesday), depending on
the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails: twice). After each waking, they
will ask you, the sleeping beauty, on what probability you will assign to the
outcome of the coin toss turning out to be the Heads. Then they will put
you, the sleeping beauty, to back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget
that waking. When you are first awakened, to what degree ought you believe
that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads?”
2. Introduction: The Thirder - Adam Elga
Elga (2000)’s argument can be summarized as the following:
From now on, let P (head) = 1/2 be the unconditional probability that a fair
coin toss will produce head. Therefore, P (tail) = 1/2.
Given that the result of the coin toss is tail, the probability that the sleeping
beauty wakes up on Monday and the probability that the sleeping beauty
wakes up on Tuesday should not be different. Therefore,
P (Monday|tail) = P (Tuesday|tail)
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As such (by Bayes’ rule),
P (Monday ∩ tail) = P (Tuesday ∩ tail)
As the result of coin toss only affects what happens on Tuesday (awake, not
awake),
P (tail|Monday) = P (head|Monday)
P (Monday ∩ tail) = P (Monday ∩ head)
Thus,
P (Monday ∩ head) = P (Monday ∩ tail) = P (Tuesday ∩ tail)
As P (Monday ∩ head) + P (Monday ∩ tail) + P (Tuesday ∩ tail) = 1,
P (Monday ∩ head) = 1
3
Therefore, when first awakened, the sleeping beauty should assign 1/3 to
the probability that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads.
The followings are not directly in Elga (2000), but they will aid our
discussions:
P (Monday) = P (Monday ∩ head) + P (Monday ∩ tail) = 2
3
P (Tuesday) =
1
3
Let the unconditional probability that the sleeping beauty is only awakened
on Monday be P (EM) (EM represents experiment on Monday only) from
now on. P (EM) = P (head) tautologically. P (ET ) = P (tail), where ET rep-
resents experiment on Tuesday also - meaning that the sleeping beauty is
awakened also on Tuesday.
Solving the equations of the following:
P (Monday) = P (Monday|EM)P (EM) + P (Monday|ET )P (ET )
P (Tuesday) = P (Tuesday|EM)P (EM) + P (Tuesday|ET )P (ET )
P (Monday|EM) + P (Tuesday|EM) = 1
P (Monday|ET ) + P (Tuesday|ET ) = 1
where P (Tuesday|EM) = 0 by the settings of the experiment produces
P (Monday|EM) = 1
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P (Tuesday|EM) = 0
P (Monday|ET ) = 1
3
P (Tuesday|ET ) = 2
3
3. Introduction: The Halfer - David Lewis
Lewis (2001)’s argument can be summarized as the following:
Because no new information has been presented to the sleeping
beauty, when awakened, the sleeping beauty should assign 1/2 to
the probability that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads. Be-
cause P (head) = 1/2 = P (head ∩Monday), P (tail) = 1/2 = P (Monday ∩
tail) + P (Tuesday ∩ tail) and P (Monday ∩ tail) = 1/4. Therefore,
P (head|Monday) = 1/2
(1/2 + 1/4)
=
2
3
P (tail|Monday) = 1
3
The following is not included in Lewis (2001), but deriving them will aid
our discussions:
P (head|Monday) = P (head ∩Monday)
P (Monday)
=
2
3
1
2
=
2
3
P (Monday)
P (Monday) =
3
4
P (Tuesday) =
1
4
Also,
P (Monday) = P (Monday|EM)P (EM) + P (Monday|ET )P (ET )
P (Tuesday) = P (Tuesday|EM)P (EM) + P (Tuesday|ET )P (ET )
P (Monday|EM) + P (Tuesday|EM) = 1
P (Monday|ET ) + P (Tuesday|ET ) = 1
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produces
P (Monday|EM) = 1
P (Tuesday|EM) = 0
P (Monday|ET ) = 1
2
P (Tuesday|ET ) = 1
2
4. But is the event being defined correctly?
It is noticeable that two representative approaches produce different
answers for P (Monday) and P (Tuesday). By examining these answers, we
may actually see which argument is right. I will argue that both approaches
are wrong, but in the end halfers are right. Let me slightly change the
question, but this change should not really affect the experiment. Instead
of not just waking up the sleeping beauty, the sleeping beauty is told before
the experiment is carried out that if the coin toss turns out to be head, the
sleeping beauty will be awakened on Monday and be killed. If the coin toss
turns out to be tail, then the sleeping beauty will be brought back to sleep
with the drug and that be awakened on Tuesday. On Tuesday, the sleeping
beauty will just be interviewed and not be killed in any case.
Now let us think about the events. Because the number of events we are
considering is considered finite, events can safely be used.
Now P (tail) = P (survive) and P (head) = P (dead on Monday), un-
conditionally speaking. But we have two different possible sub-events
for the event survive: survive ∩Monday = survived on Monday and
survive ∩ Tuesday = survived on Tuesday. Should we consider these two
events separately?
The answer, I believe is no. This is because these two events are not
actually different. If I survive on Monday (represented by conditional
p), then I will survive on Tuesday (represented by conditional q). If I
am seen as surviving on Tuesday (q), I should have survived on Monday
(p). p→ q and q → p, therefore p↔ q. Invoking Kolmogorov probability
theory and representing p and q as sets, p and q have to be the same set.
Therefore, these two sub-events are actually tautological to each other. It
is wrong to consider them as separate two sub-events that form the event
survive. The only event that exists is survive, not survived on Monday
and survived on Tuesday.
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This analogy explains where the thirder representative approach went
wrong: they thought that Monday ∩ tail and Tuesday ∩ tail are actually
separate sub-events that form the event tail. By applying the analogy above,
it is shown that these sub-events are not actually separate sub-events,
so while P (Monday|tail) = P (Tuesday|tail) is true, this does not mean
that P (Monday ∩ head) + P (Monday ∩ tail) + P (Tuesday ∩ tail) = 1.
What actually happened is double-counting. It should have been just
P (Monday ∩ head) + P (tail) = 1, where P (tail) = P (Tuesday ∩ tail) =
P (Monday ∩ tail), because these three events/sub-events are actually
referring to the same event.
We can now see that the case is back to basic coin toss issue, and
P (head) = 1/2 will be what the sleeping beauty responds when asked for
the probability of the coin toss outcome.
But the representative halfer approach also has the same “event” clarifi-
cation issue. Would there be any consequence that is actually wrong? For
this, one only needs to look at P (Monday) and P (Tuesday).
For the representative halfer approach, P (Monday) = 3/4, while
P (Tuesday) = 1/4. I will argue that for these questions, the thirder
approach is right, that P (Monday) = 2/3 and P (Tuesday) = 1/3.
Let us go back to the analogy above. For Monday, the sleeping
beauty either survives or dies, that is P (Monday|Monday) = 1 =
P (Monday ∩ survive|Monday) + P (Monday ∩ dead|Monday) and
P (Monday ∩ survive|Monday) = 1/2, P (Monday ∩ dead|Monday) = 1/2.
But if the event Monday ∩ survive happens, then Tuesday ∩ survive tau-
tologically follows. As thus, the ratio between P (Monday) and P (Tuesday)
is P (Monday) : P (Tuesday) = 2 : 1. As P (Monday) + P (Tuesday) = 1,
P (Monday) = 2/3 and P (Tuesday) = 1/3.
5. Conclusion
This short paper examined both the halfer and thirder solution for the Sleep-
ing Beauty problem. It is concluded that both solutions went astray because
they applied incorrect understanding of events in probability theory. And
then the paper examines what probability should be assigned for the ques-
tions like P (Monday), P (Tuesday).
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